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Chapter One: The Baruch Plan: Introductory Matters
Introduction and Literature Review
The advent of nuclear weapons at the end of World War Two
created massive changes in technology, warfare, and diplomacy.
After an Allied victory in the European theatre, the United States
prepared for a final confrontation with Japan. Nuclear weapons
changed the character of that assault as "two mighty blasts
awesomely punctuated the end of the most violent war in history"
(Baruch, 1960, p. 358). The development and use of nuclear weapons
also punctuated American history; scientists had finally opened the
ultimate "Pandora's Box." Americans had looked forward to peace,
yet suddenly faced "horrors greater than the world had yet known"
which made the desired peace a necessity (Coit, 1957, p. 561).
Fundamental alterations in specific cultures normally occur slowly,
perhaps only perceptible from the hindsight of the historian. The
nuclear era, however, was different, in that it "burst upon the world
with terrifying suddenness" (Boyer, 1985, p. 4). The onset of nuclear
weapons introduced a new factor which profoundly altered American
(and world) culture: the bomb "transformed not only military
strategy and international relations, but the fundamental ground of
culture and consciousness" (Boyer, 1985, p. xix).
Despite their importance, the discursive aspects of the
Nuclear Age have received little attention from rhetorical critics. A
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survey of the contents of The Quarterly Journal of Speech-
Communication Monographs. Central States Speech Journal. Western
Journal of Speech Communication. Southern Speech Communication
Journal . Communication Quarterly , and Journal of the American
Forensic Association reveals that articles on nuclear issues are rare
and that even the exceptions treat nuclear issues as secondary to
particular speakers, to the rhetoric of international relations, or to
the advancement of a particular critical tool.
While there has been relatively little critical attention paid to
nuclear issues since World War Two, there are signs that rhetorical
critics are at last becoming interested in nuclear issues and texts.
Goodnight (1983) examines Congressional hearings concerned with
nuclear evacuation policy as an example of public debate and
explores the tension between the grounding of argument in the
technical and public spheres of argument. Goodnight (1986), Rushing
(1986), and Bjork (1988) examine Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars"
speech as a challenge to conventional wisdom of deterrence, part of
a New Frontier Myth, and as means of subverting the nuclear freeze
movement, respectively. Foss and Littlejohn (1986) examine nuclear
issues in popular culture by describing the rhetorical vision found in
the television program "The Day After." Dauber's work focuses on
the technical aspects of nuclear weapons deterrence strategy (1987)
and the validity standards used to judge evidentiary claims in
technical nuclear policy discourse (1988). Kane (1988) examines the
rhetorical use of nuclear history which entrenches values and allows
political re-interpretation of foreign policy events. Hynes (1988)
discusses the various publics involved in nuclear arms negotiations
and describes this argumentation as circumscribing public debate on
nuclear matters. Schiappa (1989) and Kauffman (1989) discuss the
rhetorical implications of nuclear language choices. Studies such as
these mark a promising beginning. However, a thorough
understanding of nuclear discourse must take into account its roots
in the early atomic era.
Justification and Organization of Study
The present study seeks to develop a generic perspective
toward nuclear criticism. In doing so, it will focus on the early
nuclear age. In January of 1946, an agreement within the young
United Nations created the United Nations Atomic Energy
Commission (UNAEC), charged with the task of eliminating the
threat caused by nuclear weapons. On June 14, 1946, Truman's
appointed representative to the Commission, Bernard Baruch, gave a
speech that has been called his "greatest contribution to world
history" (White, 1950, p. 109). Baruch called for the creation of an
international agency to oversee the development of peaceful uses for
atomic energy and to proscribe the military use of nuclear weapons.
This particular text, known as the Baruch Plan, is appropriate to
study for a number of reasons. First, it is the first major public
statement following Hiroshima to express the United States'
position on the international control of nuclear weapons, making it a
key text in the chronology of "official" nuclear discourse. The
destructive ability of nuclear energy was demonstrated in Japan to
be of huge proportions, and most people considered the avoidance of
nuclear destruction a commensurate challenge. Government, the
military, and scientists worked together to devise a means of
control, convinced that the gravity of the crisis demanded a
response of great magnitude. The Baruch Plan was the culmination
of American policy that was two years in the making.
Second, the Baruch Plan set the stage for subsequent United
Nations discussion on disarmament and arms control (Rosembloom,
1953). The United Nations was to be the forum in which much
international negotiation took place, and it was expected that the
U.N. Atomic Energy Commission would bear the burden of devising
international control mechanisms that would meliorate the nuclear
threat. The manner in which the early agenda items were handled
would "set a pattern for the future" (Hewlett & Anderson, 1962, p.
577). Years later, Baruch's speech was described by a biographer as
containing recommendations on atomic energy control which
continue to stand "as the wisest counsel in the membership of the
United States Commission on Atomic Energy" which formulated
United States policy in the United Nations (Rosenbloom, 1953, p. 24).
Third, the speech is important because it is an example of
early nuclear discourse which continues to inform present nuclear
discourse. The Baruch Plan participates in a genre of discourse on
nuclear issues that sheds a unique light on contemporary discourse.
Beyer's (1985) historical analysis of the early nuclear age suggests
that a complete understanding of current nuclear status depends on
understanding the past since "all the major elements of our
contemporary engagement with the nuclear reality took shape"
immediately following the advent of nuclear weapons (p. xix). By
critically analyzing the Baruch Plan, one may uncover the themes
characteristic of the early nuclear age which Boyer argues "still
dominate our nuclear discourse today" (1 985, p. xix). This study
focuses on the Baruch Plan as a representative text of the early
nuclear age. The speech represents the early steps to confront and
control nuclear weapons and is evidence that our current discourse
is rooted in the period immediately following the development and
use of nuclear weapons. Boyer explains that it is important to
recover nuclear history because "it was in that era which now seems
so distant that the fundamental perceptions which continue to
influence our response to the nuclear menace were first articulated,
discussed, and absorbed into the living tissue of the culture" (1985,
p. 367). It was in that era that Baruch offered a prophetic vision of
the horror of nuclear weapons and a challenge to the world to work
together for peace -- a vision that continues to speak to the world
today. It is through an understanding of the nuclear past that we can
assess the nuclear present and the prospects for a non-nuclear
future.
This chapter has provided a literature review and a rationale
for studying nuclear issues and the Baruch Plan in particular.
Chapter Two provides the historical background of the speech. The
rhetorical crisis created by nuclear weapons is discussed, as is the
immediate context surrounding the speaker, Bernard Baruch, and his
audience. The "results" of the speech as conventionally assessed are
described. It is suggested that more meaningful assessments can be
made by viewing the speech from a more carefully construed critical
stance which allows the critic to consider both epideictic and
deliberative elements found in a given nuclear text.
Chapter Three suggests a framework for examining the Baruch
Plan generically. The rhetorical genre of the jeremiad is described
and more recent applications of this genre to secular or modern
concerns are discussed. The value of a jeremiadic perspective and
the rhetorical functions which a jeremiad fulfills are explained. It
is suggested that jeremiadic criticisms entail a set of standards by
which nuclear discourse should be judged. These standards call into
question assessments of "effectiveness" which rely too heavily upon
standards applied traditionally to deliberative rhetoric.
Chapter Four examines the Baruch Plan from a jeremiadic
perspective. Through a close textual analysis, it demonstrates that
the speech fulfills the functions of a jeremiad and judges the text
by the standards discussed in Chapter Three. It further argues that
the speech contains distinct generic characteristics which
characterize a "nuclear jeremiad."
Chapter Five provides a critical assessment of the Baruch Plan
based upon insights gained by a jeremiadic perspective. It argues
that viewing the Baruch Plan as a jeremiad affords significant
insight into the speech and into a particular genre of nuclear
discourse, the nuclear jeremiad.
Chapter Two: Historical Context of the Baruch Plan
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an historical context
for the Baruch Plan. It describes the rhetorical exigence created by
atomic weapons and the preliminary efforts to respond to the need
for control. The United States representative to the UNAEC, Bernard
Baruch, is introduced, as are the policy initiatives which
collectively came to be known as the Baruch Plan. Finally, the
immediate responses of various audiences to the Baruch Plan and the
conventional assessment of the speech's "results" are described.
The Rhetorical Exigence
The American public met the bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki with a great deal of apprehension. While there was great
relief that the war was finally over, and also some pleasure in
seeing Japan "repaid" for Pearl Harbor, there was a sense in which
the victory was clouded by the fear of incalculable new dangers. The
predominant response was a "surge of fear that swept America";
fear of the weapon which brought victory to the United States
(Boyer, 1985, p. 66). The bomb had come as a surprise, having been
developed, produced, and utilized in secret. The public's fear was
thus based in part on what was ncj known about the bomb as well as
on the reality of the weapon's use in Japan. The media and the public
were quick to perceive nightmarish possibilities for the bomb. This
weapon was the most destructive yet known, and was described in a
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radio news report on August 6, 1945 as "so powerful that only the
imagination of a trained scientist could dream of its existence"
("Atomic War," cited in Boyer, 1985, p. 4). Others warned of a world
left to the insects, speculated on fire-storms sweeping the earth,
and feared that science had produced Frankenstein's monster. One
editorial expressed the feeling that one could sense the "foundations
of one's own universe trembling" ("The Atomic Bomb," 1945). The
fear was consistently described in primordial terms. The weapon
represented the wresting of secrets from nature. Like Prometheus
stealing fire from the gods, humans had finally harnessed the atom
and those who drew the analogy feared divine retaliation. The fear
which filled the national consciousness was a "primitive fear, the
fear of the unknown, the fear of forces [humanity] can neither
channel nor comprehend" (Cousins, 1945, p. 5).
While the technological capabilities of nuclear weapons had
not yet made global holocaust an immediate possibility, the public
response was to articulate a fear of annihilitation. This "primal
fear of extinction" (Boyer, 1985, p. 15) was reflected in the massive
attention which the media devoted to atomic issues; both reporting
what was known and speculating on the uncertain future
implications of nuclear weapons. The media, encouraged by the
nation's opinion-molding institutions such as churches, the
government, and science, focused the public's attention on nuclear
issues.
Consequently, the months after Hiroshima saw what has been
described as "a national town meeting on the atomic bomb and its
meaning" (Boyer, 1985, p. 31). A theme commonly evoked in the
post-war climate was the need for immediate political action. An
uncertainty about the future coupled with a certainty that action
must be taken was apparent in many opinions. Columnist Elmer
Davis expressed this sentiment of urgency: "Decisions made now, in
the next two or three years, may determine the entire foreseeable
future" (in Boyer, 1985, p. 29).
The changes wrought by nuclear weapons created a rhetorical
exigence of enormous proportions. These weapons created "radical
and profound changes" (Oppenheimer, 1946, p. 22) not only in world
politics and military technology, but in the very relationship of
humankind to itself and to nature. Nuclear weapons transformed the
grounds of human reason, in that an "environment thought to be
objective, neutral, and infinitely malleable" was threatened by "a
technical ultimate - one that could obliterate its own creators"
and which engendered a belief that nature was finite and progress
questionable. The "culture that resulted promised [in part]. . . a
future without reality" by "rendering life itself vulnerable as an
ongoing proposition" (Farrell & Goodnight, 1981, pp. 277-278). In
the period following August 6, 1945, Americans were forced to
confront a "new and threatening reality of almost unfathomable
proportions" (Boyer, 1985, p. 25).
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The reaction of the American public was shaped by both
intense fear and a belief that an "urgent and decisive" political
response was critical (Boyer, 1985, p. 32). At the time this public
sense also was reflected in governmental circles both here and
abroad: "At the end of World War II, in the immediate postwar
context, there seemed to be a brief political resolve to remove
nuclear weapons from the scene. World leaders. . . insisted on the
importance of acting quickly. If such internationalization did not
occur dire consequences were predicted" (Lifton & Falk, 1 982, p.
198). The concern was thus not merely that of the masses, but also
policy-makers. In this time of great fear and uncertainty, the public
desperately needed reassurance that the extinction they feared
would not come to pass. It appeared possible that the political
resolve to provide that reassurance would be manifested in
governmental decisions.
Preliminary Efforts to Control Nuclear Technology
Among those clamoring to play a role in the shaping of
American response, and perhaps the most forceful voices of all,
were scientists -- many of whom had worked closely in developing
the bomb. For most, the responsibility was pressing and the stakes
high: "to shape, at the very dawn of the atomic age, the fundamental
contours of national attitudes toward the bomb and influence the
course of the nuclear future" (Boyer, 1985, p. 32). For these
scientists, international control of atomic energy represented the
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cause to be promoted. An October 1945 meeting of 515 scientists at
Harvard and M.I.T. drafted a five-point statement which reflected a
"rapidly evolving consensus" that "international cooperation of an
unprecedented kind is necessary for our survival" (Walker, 1945, p.
44). Scientists who had worked closely with government agencies in
the development of nuclear weapons, such as Vannevar Bush and
James Conant, urged the need for international control (Anderson &
Hewlett, 1962).
At the urging of scientists and members of Congress, in
January of 1946 Secretary of State James F. Byrnes named a
committee headed by Undersecretary Dean Acheson to prepare a plan
to guide the shaping of U.S. policy. A United Nations agreement had
created the UNAEC and the U.S. was expected to initiate discussions
on atomic energy control in this body. Acheson named a five-person
Board of Consultants chaired by David E. Lilienthal and including J.
Robert Oppenheimer to provide technical expertise in the drafting of
the proposal. On March 28, 1946, this consulting committee
submitted its report on the International Control of Atomic Energy,
which came to be known as the Acheson-Lilienthal Report. It
proposed international cooperation in the peaceful development of
atomic energy led by a United Nations authority that would survey
and control all fissionable ore on the earth, license, construct, and
monitor all national atomic energy facilities, and have broad
inspection powers to detect the diversion of atomic technology
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toward military purposes (Hewlett & Anderson, 1962). The
Acheson-Lilienthal Report reflected "the drafters' belief in the
power of reason, goodwill, and the spirit of scientific cooperation"
(Boyer, 1985, p. 53), and was to heavily influence the articulation of
U.S. policy in the Baruch Plan.
Bernard Baruch
The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission held its first
meeting on June 14, 1946. President Truman and Secretary of State
Byrnes selected Bernard Baruch to be the United States
representative to the UNAEC. Baruch was an extremely successful
Wall Street financier who had served the government in a number of
capacities. He acted as advisor to every president from Wilson to
Eisenhower. His role most often was that of an unofficial counselor,
although he ran the War Industries Board under President Wilson and
was "legendary" for his war mobilization efforts (Hewlett &
Anderson, 1962, p. 577). For all of his government service, he never
received compensation, though -- being a wealthy man -- he
certainly did not need it (Rosenbloom, 1953, p. 35).
Baruch's government service, coupled with his "shrewd
political use of his fortune" -- in the sense that he supported
political careers and campaigns without apparant partisan bias --
had earned him many friends and a great deal of influence (Acheson,
1969, p. 154). He was held in high esteem and considered very
influential abroad. He was perceived as a man of integrity and
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selflessness (Grant, 1983), and was often labeled as knowledgeable,
devoted, and possessing perseverance, consistency and foresight
(Rosenbloom, 1953). His reputation as a businessperson and
government servant led many to consider him well-qualified for the
U.N. job. Consequently, Congress and the media reacted favorably to
his selection and he faced little, if any, disapproval or delay in the
confirmation of his appointment (Coit, 1957). The news media
"never questioned Baruch's basic integrity nor his loyalty to
America" (White, 1950, p. 103). Baruch was thus seen by the
President and Byrnes as a spokesperson who could command respect.
It was hoped that Baruch's ethos would "add weight to any proposal
the United States put before the world" (Hewlett & Anderson, 1962,
p. 556).
Baruch undertook his new assignment with vigor. Though he
questioned at the outset his abilities because he was seventy-five
years old (Baruch, 1960), his strongly held belief in international
cooperation and professed horror at nuclear weapons compelled him
to accept (Grant, 1983). Baruch was given the task of devising a
proposal on international control of atomic energy which would
represent U.S. policy and which he would present to the UNAEC.
Working with the Acheson-Lilienthal Report yet not bound by it, he
was granted the authority to create a policy that need be approved
by Truman alone. After extensive research and consultation with
scientists, politicians, and his own "team" of confidants and
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advisors, he prepared and delivered the speech which represented
the U.S. policy on nuclear weapons (Rosenbloom, 1953).
The Baruch Plan
On June 14, 1946, the UNAEC met for the first time at the
Hunter College gymnasium in the Bronx. Present were the delegates
representing Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, France,
Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, the Soviet Union, the United
Kingdom and the United States. Present also were scientists, many
of whom had provided insight and expertise in the drafting of the
proposal, and the news media. Bernard Baruch took the rostrum to
announce the U.S. proposal. He was described as presenting an
"imposing appearance," "the embodiment of the elder statesman"
(Hewlett & Anderson, 1962, p. 577), and also as "looking like
everyone's grandfather" (Coit, 1957, p. 581). He delivered his speech
"simply, directly, sometimes even haltingly," and with "visible pride
in his role" (Coit, 1957, pp. 581-582). It has been suggested by one
observer that his hesitation "underscored the seriousness of his
purpose" (Coit, 1957, p. 581).
The plan itself was quite similar to the recommendations of
the Acheson-Lilienthal Report. He proposed that the United Nations
should create an International Development Authority to control the
development and use of nuclear energy. It would control all weapons
that currently existed, inspect and license all atomic activities, and
foster peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Once this authority was in
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place and adequate controls existed, then the production of nuclear
weapons would stop and existing bombs would be dismantled so that
the international authority would be the sole possesser of nuclear
technology. Baruch was unwavering in his conviction that violation
of the new agreement should be met with condign punishment -
punishment in kind. He indicated the U.S. desire to allow the
international body to hold out the threat, by its possession of
nuclear weapons, to use nuclear weapons against countries that
violated the provisions of the plan by developing nuclear weapons.
Baruch followed this claim with the proposal that the ability of the
international authority to inflict sanctions should not be weakened
by the veto power of the Security Council. He suggested that the
need for swift and sure punishment outweighed the right of any
country to veto sanctions invoked by the atomic energy authority.
Response to the Plan
Baruch's plan met with considerable support. "Praise rose in a
clamor" after the U.S. policy was presented (Coit, 1957, p. 585),
"congratulatory messages deluged Baruch's headquarters" (Hewlett &
Anderson, 1962, p. 582), and Baruch later claimed that "public
opinion upheld the plan by a large majority" (1960, p. 373). The
media was certainly on the whole in favor of the plan: "Editors of
the nation's leading newspapers and radio commentators called
Baruch's speech and plan a masterly compound of imaginative
idealism and tough practicality" (Rosenbloom, 1953, p. 276). With
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the exception of isolationist newspapers, the media was
overwhelmingly enthusiastic. The official reactions of most other
members of the UNAEC were expressions of general approval. While
there were differences, most notably on the issue of sanctions and
the veto power, the Commission in general supported the proposals
and principles conveyed by the plan.
However, the country from whom a positive response was most
hoped for was the Soviet Union. Its representative, Andrei Gromyko,
presented his country's official response on June 19. The Soviet
Union proposed that an international agreement immediately prohibit
the production and use of atomic weapons and that an authority to
control atomic energy be created and put in place after all the
signatories had obligated themselves not to use atomic weapons and
had destroyed existing bombs. Essentially, the Soviet response
would have reversed the order of the Baruch Plan. The Baruch Plan
would allow the U.S. to maintain its atomic weapons until it was
convinced that adequate controls were in place while at the same
time preventing the Soviet Union from developing these weapons.
"The U.S. thus preserved a de facto veto over the entire plan. . . While
the Soviets gave up critical information about their fissionable
resources and their progress in atomic-weapons research, in other
words, the U.S. could retain and enlarge its stock of bombs, conduct
its tests, and in general maintain its massive lead in the field"
(Boyer, 1985, p. 54). The Soviet Union was trying to recover from a
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devastating war on her territory and was deeply suspicious of the
outside world, particularly a U.S. that possessed a weapon of hugely
destructive proportions. Accordingly, "viewed from Moscow. . . the
plan seemed a formula for perpetuating American nuclear
superiority into the indefinite future" (Boyer, 1985, p. 55). Thus the
Soviets insisted that a world moratorium on the production and use
of atomic weapons must precede any agreement on international
control. Negotiations within the UNAEC continued throughout the
year.
In December, 1946, Baruch finally forced a vote, convinced
that an impasse had been reached and that at least the votes of the
committee would be on record before the world. The entire report
received ten "ayes." The Soviet Union and Poland abstained. This
completed Baruch's tenure on the Committee. The report would be
submitted to the Security Council and the issue of disarmament
would now be conducted within the larger forum of the United
Nations.
Viewed in the context of 1945-1946, and viewed merely as a
proposal put forward by the United States and rejected by the Soviet
Union, an assessment of the Baruch Plan's effectiveness would be
fairly negative. The speech gathered support from the media and the
American public, thus it had a limited effect in generating support
for its speaker and proposal. Judged by neo-Aristotelian standards,
or by deliberative standards such as those utilized by Ivie (1987),
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the plan was a failure in its apparant goal of achieving the
implementation of the U.S. plan for disarmament in the international
community. Evaluating the speech in terms of its effects on its
immediate audience and its ability to bring about a particular policy
of international control yields a negative verdict for the Baruch
Plan. However, the speech is moving, similar to the Coatsville
Address in being unsuccessful in the short run but still worthy of
study; "moving enough so that the bare calculation of its immediate
effects is insufficient to account for it, moving enough so that the
contemporary reader cannot feel its power as having been spent" on
its 1946 audience (Black, 1978, p. 83). To understand the manner in
which the speech lives, it is important to view the Baruch Plan from
a different perspective. The Baruch Plan can be seen as a success
when placed in a generic framework which includes epideictic, as
well as deliberative elements -- the jeremiadic perspective.
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Chapter Three: The Jeremiad as Rhetorical Form
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a generic framework
for examining the Baruch Plan. The chapter describes the rhetorical
genre of the Jeremiad, explains how jeremiads function rhetorically,
and suggests standards by which jeremiadic texts should be judged.
Jamieson defines genre as signifying a "distinct species, form, type,
or kind" of discourse (1973, p. 162). The notion of genre suggests
that certain types of works share characteristics independent of
their authors or times of creation. A rhetorical genre embraces
"discourses which share substantive, stylistic, and situational
characteristics" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1978, p. 20). One genre of
rhetoric that has been identified is the jeremiad.
Background
Bercovitch describes the American jeremiad as a "mode of
public exhortation that originated in the European pulpit, was
transformed in both form and content by the New England Puritans,
persisted through the eighteenth century, and helped sustain a
national dream through two hundred years of turbulence and change"
(1978, p. xi). The jeremiad began as a political sermon. The
Puritans believed that they were a chosen people led to a promised
land on a mission from God. As a people ordained to progress, they
required a conceptual mechanism to understand and integrate the
trials and travails of the New World. The answer was the jeremiad:
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a "new rhetorical form among the sermons of the Puritan preachers"
in the seventeenth century (Bormann, 1977, p. 131).
In these sermons, the clergy portrayed calamity as something
sent by God to punish or instruct the community when sins
threatened their mission. The people were "exhorted" to "get right
with God" (Ritter, 1980, p. 157). As chosen people with a special
purpose, problems or calamities could be seen as undermining their
progress or leading the chosen astray. Having a "special relationship
to God as a chosen people" they were warned that they "must face
disaster if they did not turn back from corruption to live by the
national covenant'" (Ritter, 1980, p. 157). Calamity was explained
by the jeremiads as a test of the community's dedication and
resolve. The assurance of the jeremiad was that recommitment by
the community would lead to God lifting the punishment.
The minister in the jeremiad was not only a prophet apart from
the community "a voice in the wilderness -- but who was at the
same time a part of the community" (Ritter, 1980, p. 157). In the
Puritan jeremiads, the "spokesmen shared in the sins of their
society. They were very much a part of the established order; often
they were political and social leaders as well as religious ones"
(Ritter, 1980, p. 158). These Jeremiahs were a part of the
community but also respected leaders of the social order.
Form of the Jeremiad
Typically, the Puritan jeremiad followed a "rigid
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organizational pattern" (Ritter, 1980, p. 157) which identified a sin
or sins as the cause or source of the troubles or calamity and then
provided a penitent solution. In form, the Puritan jeremiad first
"presented a Scriptural precedent that should serve as the communal
norm" (Johannesen, 1985, p. 158). The label jeremiad is derived
from the frequent use of the Old Testament prophet Jeremiah in the
citing of Scripture in the sermon. Second, the jeremiad "condemned
in detail the fallen state of the community in breaking the covenant"
(Johannesen, 1985, p. 158). The people were told that they had
sinned; had fallen as a community by breaking their "special
covenant with God in faith or in deed" (Ritter, 1980, p. 158). The
minister would suggest that the present was characterized by "evils
that God was visiting upon His people as punishment" (Ritter, 1980,
p. 158). Third, the people were "called upon the realize their errors
and to repent - to restore their part of the covenant with God and
to return to the true principles of the church before it was too late"
(Ritter, 1980, p. 158). Finally, the people were told that God would
remove the punishment if they acted and they were "offered a
prophetic vision of an ideal future, of the good things to come"
(Johannesen, 1985, p. 158). Thus by taking the action that the
minister suggested, the community could expect the lifting of God's
punishment and "the fulfillment of God's promise to His people --
the restoration of progress for the people under special and divine
protection" (Ritter, 1980, p. 158).
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Over time, the jeremiad as a rhetorical form has proven to be
highly flexible. As a form it survived the demise of the Puritan
theocracy and was used by both Rebels and Tories during the
Revolution. By use of the jeremiad, the Rebels could see the
revolution as God using the British to test the resolve and courage of
the colonists, their ability to stand up for themselves. The Tories,
on the other hand could see the rebellion as a punishment from God
for the impieties of the colonists. Gradually, the "God" of Puritan
Jeremiahs became the more secularized "Providence" or "History" of
their descendents. Carpenter has identified an "historical jeremiad,"
a secular treatise which asks its audience to see themselves as a
chosen people "confronted with a timely if not urgent warning that
unless a certain course of atoning action is followed dire
consequences will follow" (1978, p. 104). Like the Puritan jeremiad,
the characteristics of a historical jeremiad include introductions
and conclusions which evoke "feelings of impending doom," the claim
that "adoption of a specific policy would insure continued
well-being and ultimate salvation," and a permeating vision or
"second persona" of a "model for the reader as part of a chosen
people" (Carpenter, 1978, p. 113).
Johannesen describes a modern or secular jeremiad which also
depicts "Americans as unique or 'chosen' people and envision[s]
America as a promised land with a special destiny. . ." (1985, p. 160).
In the modern jeremiad, "present social ills or the crisis situation
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at hand are depicted as urgent, as requiring action, redemption, and
reform before it is too late, as representing the verge of impending
doom, and as a sign of breaking commitment to the fundamental
principles of the American dream" (1985, p. 161).
In his analysis of presidential nomination acceptance
speeches, Ritter finds that the jeremiad's theme remains
"fundamentally intact: Americans are warned that they have
deviated from the abiding principles of the American Dream; their
present suffering is a sign of their infidelity to the past." In the
jeremiad, the people are offered a path "through repentance back to
their fundamental national values" which would "restore America to
its former greatness. Like the Puritan form, the modern jeremiad
both laments America's present condition and celebrates the
prospect of its ultimate fulfillment" (1980, p. 158-9).
Functions of the Jeremiad
Although it has been sufficiently flexible over 200 years to be
adapted to different community needs and to the more secularized
context of modern American culture, the jeremiad's four basic
functions have not changed. First, the jeremiad functions to help
"define (and redefine)" the meaning of the past (Ritter, 1980, p. 164).
The jeremiad reminds the audience of community norms, of their
status as special people with a particular mission or destiny. By
reminding the audience of the relevant past it provides a perspective
on the present and also "stands as a bridge between the past and the
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future, charting the course to future glory by calling for fidelity to
old ideals" (Ritter, 1980, p. 164).
Second, the jeremiad serves to "interpret and define the
present" (Ritter, 1980, p. 167). As a rhetorical form, the jeremiad
"accounts for a time of troubles (evil)" (Bormann, 1977, p.130), so
that present problems are seen in the context of the past. The
jeremiad suggests a movement from past to present, from "the ideal
of community to [an explanation of] the shortcomings of community
life" (Bercovitch, 1978, p. 16).
The third rhetorical function of jeremiads is to adjust "the
political policies of the present with the ideals of the past" (Ritter,
1980, p. 167). Jeremiads interpret the present situation as a sin or
error on the part of the community, but also portray present events
as offering the chance for change and recommitment to positive
values or covenants of the community by "stressing the ways in
which calamities, adversities, and sins provide opportunities for
redemption, restoration, and progress" (Johannessen, 1985, p. 159).
As such, "the jeremiad has the potential to provide a powerful
impetus to action and reform" (Bormann, 1977, p. 132). The account
of the past and present is used to "impel" the community to action
(Bormann, 1977, p. 130). The jeremiad moves the audience through a
renewed understanding of the past and present "forward, with
prophetic assurance, toward a resolution that incorporates (as it
transforms) both the promise and the condemnation" of the
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community's actions (Bercovitch, 1978, p. 16). The jeremiad was
thus not merely a condemnation of the community (Johannesen,
1 985, p. 1 61 ). While decrying the sins of the present, the jeremiad
is optimistic, holding out the prospect of "redemption, promise, and
progress" (Johannesen, 1985, p. 159). The aim of the jeremiad is
"correction more than simply destruction" (Johannesen, 1985, p.
159), reflecting the "historic Jeremiah's role both of castigating
apostasy and of heralding a bright future" (Johannesen, 1985, p.
1 59). A final function of the jeremiad is to "promote social
cohesion" in the community or audience (Ritter, 1980, p. 167). The
account given of the past and present serves as "a basis to unify the
community" (Bormann, 1977, p. 130). By calling on the audience to
renew its commitment to past ideals and to rededicate itself to
completing its mission, "the modern secular jeremiad. . . also
functions to promote social cohesion." The jeremiad "fosters a
sense of community and national unity" by reference to a "common
cultural memory which unifies the past and future" (Johannesen,
1985, p.161). By referring to promises and ideals of the past and
positing a brighter future, the audience experiences an "anticipatory
sense of a relevant destiny" (Carpenter, 1978, p. 106). Often, the
audience is presented with a "rhetorical vision" of a model person -
an "abstraction personified as a character" which has
characteristics or holds values that the rhetor would have his
audience share in common. This model person, or second persona,
26
provides the example which the audience should emulate thereby
providing the "means by which the audience could insure its
continued well-being and ultimate salvation" (Carpenter, 1978, p.
110).
The jeremiad as a rhetorical form posits a transcendant view
of community. The consensus called for is one of "calling and
enterprise" rather than "national tradition or genealogical patterns;
and it implies a form of community without geographical
boundaries" (Johannesen, 1985, p. 26). Be they members of a
religious group, citiczens of a particular nation, or of the world at
large, the jeremiad challenges the audience to see itself as a unified
community.
The form and functions of the jeremiad genre suggest that it
shares elements of both the deliberative and epideictic
classifications of rhetoric. The deliberative classification of
rhetoric contains discourse which seeks to change policy. Aristotle
calls deliberative that rhetoric which seeks to "either exhort or to
dissuade" action (1926, 1, ch. 2, 1358b). It prescribes a future
action by making a judgment about what should be done; it defines a
course of action for the audience. Epideictic rhetoric is rhetoric of
praise or blame. In it one finds the "demonstration of the honorable
or the shameful" (Kennedy, 1980, p. 73).
Deliberative and epideictic rhetoric often function together, as
deliberative rhetoric calls for action and epideictic rhetoric
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"strengthens the disposition toward action by increasing adherence
to the values it lauds" (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 50).
An audience will not act on a policy without the values which
provide a foundation for policy choices. Aristotle acknowledges that
deliberative and epideictic rhetoric need each other: "Praise and
counsels have a common aspect, for what you might suggest in
counseling becomes encomium by a change in the phrase" (1926, 1,
ch. 9, 1368a). Deliberative choices, then, rest upon the values
supported by epideictic elements.
The genre of the jeremiad contains elements of both
deliberative and epideictic rhetoric. The jeremiad calls for action
by presenting a policy for the audience, but it also acts to praise and
blame by basing the request for that action upon the creation of a
disposition to act. It decries the current situation of sin on the
basis of failure to adhere to the values of the past. It praises with a
vision of who the audience can become and lauds the values of the
past while it damns the failure of the audience to uphold those
values. Therefore, a jeremiad creates a context in which a policy
can be chosen or action can be taken by exhorting the audience to
adopt or reaffirm certain values.
Identifying a genre allows the critic to recognize standards by
which discourse within that genre should be evaluated. Mohrmann
and Leff, in their rationale for neo-classical criticism, argue that
the "immediate advantage" of describing a genre is that it "points to
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intrinsic standards for judging a particular kind of discourse" (1 974,
p. 463). The standards forjudging a text, then, should be appropriate
to the genre to which the text belongs; the relevant issue is
whether the speech fulfills the demands of its genre. The rhetorical
form and functions of the jeremiad suggest standards of judgment
by which jeremiadic texts should be evaluated.
The first function, defining the past, suggests that the rhetor's
goal is to create a compelling story or narrative which encapsulates
history by reference to social values and communal ideals. The
jeremiad involves an interpretation of the community's heritage.
This interpretation is not reporting historical "facts", but creating
the history and defining the community identity in order to justify
the vision of the future later presented. "Because present policies
are measured against the standards" of the past, "a people's vision of
their past dictates their present purpose" (Ritter, 1980, p. 165). The
test of individual discourse for this function is whether the rhetor's
vision of the past captures the attention of the audience and lends
itself to the reproduction of this vision by the audience.
The second function of the jeremiad is to interpret and define
the present in light of the past and the values to which the audience
subscribes. As such, the rhetor must explain the problems or sins of
the present situation in a manner which accounts for the evil by
referring to the community's past commitment to certain values and
trying to prevent neglect of those same values.
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The third function of the jeremiad is to redeem and restore
traditional values. The rhetor must provide a mechanism by which
the audience can escape the calamity. The rhetor suggests a vision
of what kind of persons the audience can become, and how such
persons would act. The action to be taken must be justified in terms
of rewards of the future. The audience must believe that the harms
justify the action and that the future will be better for having acted.
Finally, the jeremiad creates social cohesion in the audience.
The rhetor creates social cohesion by helping the audience see itself
as a community with a common past, bound together in the present
troubles, and promised an ultimate fulfillment. In doing so, "the
speaker tries to establish a sense of communion centered around
particular values recognized by the audience" and to tie the action
proposed to the ideals and values of the community (Perelman &
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 51). Further, jeremiads often create
cohesion by positing a second persona -- an implied auditor or
"model of what the rhetor would have his real auditor become"
(Black, 1970, p. 113). Jeremiads then can be appraised by critical
judgments of the image the rhetor would have his audience embody
as well as how effectively the rhetor creates a sense of community.
Jeremiads may be judged in terms of how well they fulfill
their functions. Because jeremiads contain both epideictic and
deliberative elements, such judgments should assess the action
called for in a given jeremiad, as well as the values which are
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praised or damned. Furthermore, because the Jeremiah represents a
distinct kind of rhetorical persona, special attention should be
accorded speaker ethos. The Jeremiah speaks as a prophet , exhorting
the people to recognize that they have strayed and to recommit
themselves to a set of values by acting to atone for sins. If the
prophet is proven "right" over time; if the warnings are borne out by
future events, then the rhetor's goal of defining the past and
interpreting the future is met. The nature of prophecy is to predict
the future. By definition, a Jeremiah is ahead of his or her time; a
voice crying in the wilderness. Jeremiadic discourse is distinct
from other calls for policy change in that choosing the proposal
entails accepting a more extreme view of the present and the future
than ordinary policy options. Also, a prophet's vision may be only
understood over time. If another, less immediate audience to a
jeremiad takes heed of the warnings in time and acts, then the
rhetor can be said to be successful in fulfilling the functions of
jeremiadic discourse. Consequently, jeremiadic discourse should be
evaluated by standards more sensitive to the role of the rhetor and
the passage of time than typical deliberative rhetoric.
Assessing a jeremiad involves judging it by how it fulfills the
functions of the genre. A jeremiad functions to define the past and
present, provide an opportunity for redemption, and create social
cohesion. A sensitivity to the role of the rhetor as prophet suggests
that the functions of the jeremiad discussed above can be evaluated
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in, as well as over , time, in that the intensity of adherence to values
is increased in such a way to "set in motion the intended action" or
to create in hearers a "willingness to act which will appear" at a
future time (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 45). This
affords the critic the ability to make judgments about a text which
are consistent with and appropriate to the genre in which the
discourse is situated and to see the manner in which the discourse
is influential over time.
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Chapter Four: The Baruch Plan and the Nuclear Jeremiad
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the Baruch Plan from
a jeremiadic perspective. It argues that the Baruch Plan can be
usefully viewed from the erspective of the jeremiad genre. An
examination of the Baruch Plan informed by the characteristics of
the jeremiadic tradition suggests that the speech shares features
with the jeremiad and fulfills the cultural functions of the
jeremiad. This chapter argues further that the Baruch Plan also
extends the jeremiad into the nuclear era, representing a new
"sub-genre" which can usefully be labeled the "nuclear jeremiad."
The approach taken in this chapter is that of generic criticism.
Generic criticism uses the standards of form/function peculiar to a
given genre to provide "critical illumination" of a text. Critical
insights to a text are the result of "systematic, close textual
analysis" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1978, p. 18). Generic criticism is
the "measurement of the text against a pre-existing mode"
(Campbell & Jamieson, 1978, p. 16). Also referred to as "generic
participation," Harrell and Linkugel explain this process as
"determining what speeches participate in which genres.
Procedurally, this involves the testing of an instance of discourse in
question against the generic description" (1978, p. 275). Ritter's
examination of Presidential nomination acceptance addresses
utilizes this method: "a kind of parallel case or analogic process
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which compares one type of discourse. . . with the chief
characteristics and functions of a well-established rhetorical genre
(the Puritan jeremiad)" (1980, p. 157).
The theme of Baruch's speech is that the human race faces
death unless humanity can reject nuclear weapons. Baruch urges his
audience to see the current situation as dangerous and to view the
human race as on a path to destruction which can be avoided only by
adopting a plan of international control of nuclear weapons. By
turning back, the future can be bright and free from the dangers of
the present. In other words, Baruch, in the best jeremiadic
tradition, stresses first, the problem facing the world, second, the
opportunity for escape, and third a vision of salvation for the future.
The sections that follow illustrate that Baruch's speech is
characteristic of a jeremiad in both form and function .
The Urgent Problem
Baruch sets a tone of urgency by calling his topic "the subject
of life itself" (All quotations unless otherwise indicated are from
Baruch, 1946). Although the international climate of fear hardly
made it necessary, Baruch makes the claim that nuclear weapons
threaten the survival of humankind. He characterizes the choice as
one between "the quick and the dead." The nuclear age is a "black
portent" which holds the world "slave to fear." Because "science has
torn from nature a secret so vast in its proportions that our minds
cower from the terror it creates," the future holds "world
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destruction." These times are times of "peril" and "heart stopping
fears which now beset the world." Baruch warns of a "famine in the
world today" which "starves" humanity's "hunger of the spirit." The
people of the world "hate war" which is a "menace to all" and is a
"devastation" and "degradation" in which "victor, vanquished, and
neutral" are all affected. He stresses that the people have a
"longing" for peace and urgently need to turn away from the "dread
power" against which there is no "adequate defense." The dread
power is a "baleful" instrument used for "death." He warns of the
"devilish program" of "dread secret weapons" which takes the world
back into the "Dark Ages" into "Chaos." This period of "gloom" and
"hopelessness" is to be seen as a "fiery trial." Baruch wants his
audience to believe that the present is horrible, that death is "the
price of war" and that it must act quickly for "to delay may be to
die."
With these claims Baruch's speech functions as a jeremiad by
defining the past and present, establishing the urgency of the
problems to motivate his audience to act, and attempting to build
cohesion in his audience. First, the past that Baruch portrays is not
that of value-free science making progress but the fiendish tearing
or stealing of a secret which is the "miracle of the atom." He wants
the audience to see the past as a mistake and the present as the
punishment humankind is faced with for having created the dreadful
weapons.
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Second, Baruch defines and interprets the present. He paints a
frightening picture of the current situation with vivid imagery of
the horrors of nuclear destruction. Like the classic Jeremiah he
characterizes through either/or language the urgency of the
situation. Baruch employs antithesis heavily in the speech by
making the problem of nuclear control one of only two choices, one
clearly to be prefered to the other. The choice is between "World
Peace or World Destruction," "death" or life," courage or cowardice,"
"fear" or "hope," Cosmos" or "Chaos," "good" or "evil," and finally,
"pain" and "peace" or "death" and "war." Baruch makes it clear what
he insists is at stake. He makes the option of his coming solution
appear obvious. Baruch suggests that his audience stands "at a
pivotal point in time," presented with only two choices. This makes
it more likely that the audience will act since he creates a "sense of
urgency and impending doom" so that his audience will find his
solution meaningful and necessary (Carpenter, 1978, p. 105).
Third, Baruch creates a sense of community and social
cohesion. While he acknowledges that the U.S. is the nation in which
nuclear weapons came to "fruition," the finger he points is at the
abstract, general, supra-national concept of "Science." Human
enterprise has caused the harm; "science has taught us how to put
the atom to work." He also argues that the world as a whole is being
punished and threatened with death. When he claims that war
affects everyone "victor and vanquished and neutral alike," no one
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can "escape war's devastation," and vividly portrays the terrors and
destruction of nuclear weapons he draws the audience together into
a commonly threatened whole. He stresses throughout that everyone
wants peace and that the people of the world desire an end to fear.
He addresses his speech not merely to the Commission, but to his
"fellow citizens of the world."
A Way to Escape the Problem
Baruch's second theme is the need for the audience to adopt his
solution of international control of nuclear weapons. In his proposal
he suggests that the world will find "hope which with faith can work
salvation" for the world. The world must "elect world peace" and
find a "meeting of the minds and the hearts" of the people. He claims
that "only in the will of mankind lies the answer." Thus the people
are told that if only they will act, they can forge their redemption,
and "provide the mechanism to assure" the world safety and freedom
from fear and destruction by precluding the use of nuclear weapons
in war. The audience is called upon to "answer" the "demands" for
peace. If the "world will join in a pact" to "build a workable plan"
and "erect a safeguard," then it will find salvation. He reminds his
audience that it must act because it is "consecrated" to ending the
threat of war. He spells out the specifics of the United States' plan
without great elaboration and in a simple, plain style distinct from
the rest of the speech.
In these claims, Baruch provides the audience with a means to
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repent. His policy can be their salvation. His words are aimed at
fulfilling the third function of jeremiads: showing the audience how
they can atone for their sins. He aligns policy routes with his
previous interpretation of the past and the present. He has proven
that nuclear weapons are awful and that humankind must act. He
sets forth his proposal and then seeks to demonstrate that it is the
best way for humans to undo what they have done. He also answers
two potential objections to his plan by arguing first, that words
without sanctions are useless and second, that the veto power must
be suspended. Baruch claims that "penalization is essential" because
"simple renunciation" of weapons has failed in the past. Thus we
need "enforceable sanctions," "condign punishment" (punishment in
kind), and "an international law with teeth in it," not merely "pious
thoughts." He appeals to the "common good," "public opinion," and a
"world movement toward security" to justify the strict enforcement
mechanisms he proposes. He claims that the the matter of
punishment "goes straight to the veto power" and that there can be
no veto power because "the bomb does not wait upon debate." The
"imperative speed" required for punishment given the nature of
nuclear weapons is a basis to justify suspension of the veto power
in this case.
In his explanation of the plan Baruch also uses the past and the
immediate context as proof for the legitimacy of action. Baruch
uses an "historical approach" to buttress his argument for sanctions.
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First he argues that punishment is justified by the historical efforts
at punishment employed by the United States, United Kingdom,
France and the Soviet Union at Nuremberg. He also cites the General
Assembly of the United Nations mandate that created the UNAEC
which calls for "effective safeguards," and finally cites the
conference attended by the U.S., the U.K, and the U.S.S.R in December
of 1945 in the statements of which Baruch finds "implicit"
justification for "the process of prevention and penalization."
A Vision of the Future
Baruch makes clear that he knows that his plan will be
difficult to impletment. The "way is thorny" and humans must act
with "hope," "faith," and "courage" in order to lift nuclear power
from "use in death to use for life." The means of redemption are
severe, but so is the sin humanity must pay for. The future holds
"salvation" and is characterized by "peace" and "security." This life
is "a new life free from fear" and "the fulfillment of the aspirations
of mankind." This pattern of "world salvation" is a "fairer, surer"
life of peace. He encourages the audience to believe that human
enterprise can also "produce with will and faith the miracle of
peace," and eliminate war itself by providing a "guarantee of safety."
Rather than Chaos, this new life is "Cosmos." With international
cooperation peace can be "tranquil and secure" rather than a
"feverish interlude between wars." By acting to atone, the audience
can "stand erect with their faces to the sun" rather than "burrowing
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into the ground like rats." They may face "pain as the price of peace"
but it will be worth it to avoid "death as the price of war." He
encourages the audience to believe that the "path" to salvation
"grows brighter" by their action and that they can expect a world
which is safer, not paralyzed by fear, and characterized by peace and
cooperation.
Baruch's vision of the future helps to make his audience
willing to persevere in their actions, and holds out a reward (the
lifting of the current punishment) if only it has the courage to act.
He also creates social cohesion by characterizing the future as
cooperatively fashioned human salvation. The world acts together
and is rewarded together. Baruch ends his speech by paraphrasing
Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address. He reminds his listeners that
they "cannot escape history," that they will face honor or dishonor
depending on their choice. They know how to "save peace" and must
face the world's praise or condemnation for their actions. They can
choose to "nobly save, or meanly lose, the last, best hope of earth."
Baruch as a speaker embodies the characteristics of the
classic Jeremiah. He speaks as a part of the community and thus
shares in its sin, yet he also speaks as a prophet, urging the
community to recognize their error. His character at the time of his
appointment to the U.N.A.E.C. was above reproach and he was a highly
respected voice of the established political order.
Baruch's speech is a jeremiad. It identifies a sin and condemns
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the fallen community, provides an action the audience can take
which atones for the sin and allows them to repent, and it offers a
vision of what the world will be like after the lifting of the
punishment. He warns the audience that it must act or the
consequences will be dire and creates a sense of impending doom.
Throughout he offers a "second persona" - a vision of what he would
have his audience be. He makes this clear by telling the audience
that some will see in his plan "only emptiness. Each of us carries
his own mirror in which is reflected hope-or determined
desperation-courage or cowardice." He wants the audience to be
hopeful, faithful, and courageous, and also willing to sacrifice and
work together toward salvation. As befits the rhetorical demands of
a jeremiad, Baruch's speech defines the past, interprets the present,
offers a solution, and promotes social cohesion.
The Nuclear Jeremiad
Campbell and Jamieson suggest that generic criticism is
useful because it allows the critic to point out differences in texts
as well as similarities. The genre of the jeremiad has been
identified as at work throughout many generations. As discussed in
Chapter Three, the jeremiad has undergone changes in its history -
evolving to meet the rhetorical needs of a nation struggling for
independence and coping with its changing mission and destiny. This
indicates that "while traditional genres may color rhetoric, they do
not ossify it" (Jamieson, 1973, p. 168).
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Viewed not as a "static" form but an "evolving" phenomenon
(Jamieson, 1973, p. 168), the genre of the jeremiad has developed a
flexibility over time while still maintaining its essential
characteristics. The Baruch Plan is characteristic of traditional
jeremiads but also demonstrates how the genre has evolved. In
three important respects, the Baruch Plan may be characterized as a
new sort of jeremiad, a jeremiad tuned to the exigencies of a
nuclear and increasingly interdependent world -- the nuclear
jeremiad.
Nuclear Weapons and Scientific Sin
The nature of nuclear weapons suggests that the "sin" posited
in the nuclear jeremiad is a scientific sin. The sin is a
technological sin which is the product of science and human
invention. This presents the rhetor of a nuclear jeremiad with
particular problems. Scientific problems often lend themselves to
scientific solution, and are difficult to transport into the moral
realm. The rhetor must present an interpretation of the present and
vision of the future which transcends technical concerns by drawing
the audience and the issues onto moral ground. Baruch blames
Science for the problem but notes that Science cannot provide the
solution since, although in the past Science provided a defense for
every weapon that created terror, we now "face a condition in which
adequate defense does not exist." He answers the possibility that
technology can solve the problem and move to the conclusion that
42
putting the atom to work for good "lies in the domain dealing with
the principles of human duty." Baruch's warning and vision make it
clear that this scientific problem is a problem "more of ethics than
of physics." By focusing his speech on humans having to act together
out of moral duty, and by sandwiching the technical specifics of his
proposal between moral claims, Baruch is able to transport the
problem out of the laboratory and into the moral realm.
Also, a scientific-technological sin means that the
relationship between the source of evil and the source of action is
more complex in a nuclear jeremiad. This may make it difficult for
action to be taken since the action may beyond the audience's and
rhetor's control and power. In traditional jeremiads, the audience
could take direct action, such as being chaste, or pious, or working
harder, more easily than in the nuclear age, when the public may not
have sufficient power to act despite their conviction. For example,
if Baruch succeeded in convincing people that international control
was the solution to the nuclear threat, but their action could not
stop the already ongoing development of nuclear weapons in another
country, then their conviction would be insufficient given the
extra-textual phenomenon. Boyer tempers his regret at the "failure"
of the Baruch Plan by wondering "was any other outcome possible. .
.
.Was international control ever in the cards at a time when the
Soviet Union was working feverishly to build its own atomic bomb?
Probably not" (1985, p. 56). This suggests that in the nuclear
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jeremiad the action called for may be quite complicated and
assessments need to take into account phenomena outside of the
audience's control.
Similarly, the audience may not perceive itself as having the
power to act and thus may be more likely to defer to scientific or
technological expertise. Public opinion polls conducted in 1946
suggest that the audience to the Baruch Plan was influenced by a
lack of belief in their power to act and imply that the nuclear
jeremiad, by its very subject, entails a difficulty for the audience to
perceive their power. The nature of the nuclear threat engenders a
degree of fatalism in the public; "the very magnitude of the danger"
may lead people to "deny it [nuclear war] a place among the issues"
the public spends time "consciously worrying about" (Boyer, 1985, p.
23). Nuclear issues are also often met with a generalized faith in
"the inexhaustibility of scientific invention" and a heavy "reliance on
'the authorities.'" Coupled with a lack of information and a belief
that the business of nuclear weapons goes on above people's heads
and is a matter appropriate for the experts and the leaders to
decide, nuclear issues make it difficult for the public to perceive
that they have power to act. Given the complication involved in the
relationship between the sin and the atoning action requested, the
rhetor in the nuclear jeremiad must create a sense of empowerment
for the audience. Baruch accomplishes this by providing a broad
overview of the issues, by placing the matter in a meaningful
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context of human will and human action. He allows the audience to
see the implications of alternative courses of action and provides
for them a way of seeing the threat of nuclear weapons as one that
can be solved by all humans dedicating themselves to peace and
beginning a process of peace which Baruch likens to a person
"learning to say 'A'" and then being able to learn the rest of the
alphabet as well.
Nuclear Weapons and the Future
The transgenerational nature of nuclear weapons suggests that
a nuclear jeremiad is enlarged in time. The threat posed by the sin
in a nuclear jeremiad is the punishment of future generations as
well as the present. Nuclear weapons doom the audience and its
posterity. As such the rhetor speaks over , as well as in, time. He or
she must address future generations. Baruch acknowledges this
concept in the speech by noting that the choices taken will "light"
the audience down "to the latest generation" in either honor or
dishonor. The Baruch Plan is a speech that is not easily dated. With
the exception of references to specific world leaders that would
allow the reader to place the speech in time, this speech is a speech
that could have been given in 1966, 1986, or, if things continue as
they are, 1996. Also, Baruch's use of archetypal metaphors allows
him to speak over time. Baruch casts the choice facing humanity as
"death" or "life," "cosmos" or "chaos," "light" or "dark" -- terms
which are persuasive throughout time and are not likely to change
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with alterations in specific international policy. Baruch's language
choices are not blandly vague, but timeless in their gravity, allowing
him to successfully address himself to the future; adapting to the
unique demands of a nuclear jeremiad.
Nuclear Weapons and the Community
The nature of nuclear weapons broadens the nature of
community appealed to and thus the jeremiad is enlarged in space.
In the nuclear jeremiad, the concept of community is expanded to
global dimensions. The early jeremiads refered to the spiritual and
national family of the Puritans, and other jeremiads referred to
political alliances and the national mission of the American Dream.
In each of these cases, the concept of family and community
includes "the notion of some founder shared in common, or some
covenant or constitution or historical act from which the group is
derived" (Burke, 1945, p. 29).
In the nuclear jeremiad the community and family appealed to
is the family of all humanity. The world and all its people are
threatened and the world is called upon to act together to bring
about salvation. This concept of community transcends what Baruch
decries as "narrow sovereignity." This is appropriate since nuclear
weapons are characterized by Baruch as the fruit of Science (and not
a particular nation), threatening every person regardless of
nationality or alliance, and only able to be controlled through
international cooperation. Rather than merely ask for cooperation
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and unity, Baruch's arguments demand it, as he claims that the
specter of nuclear war forcefully binds humans together in terror at
a common enemy. None can "escape war's devastation." All are
affected "physically, economically, and morally." The nature of
foreign policy is changed by the "new age" of nuclear capability, he
argues, since anything which threatens peace anywhere, at any time,
"concerns each and all of us." For Baruch, the only alternative to
international cooperation is "international disintegration."
In addition to drawing the international community together
to fight a common enemy, Baruch appeals to a variety of cultures
through his use of archetypal myth. A "secret," "torn from nature"
threatens destruction. Action can lead the world to "salvation"
which will lift humans from "death to [a new] life." His language
reminds the audience of the Eden-myth in which Eve ate of fruit
from the forbidden tree of knowledge and brought sin to humankind.
This sin can be atoned for and salvation can be found. Baruch
reminds his audience that his plan holds the promise of
"redemption:" "It is for us to accept, or to reject -- if we dare, this
doctrine of salvation. It springs from stark necessity, and that is
inexorable" (in Rosenbloom, 1953, p. 285-7). Baruch's references to
sin and the turning to a life of salvation are capable of eliciting
strong feelings from a wide variety of cultures; enabling him to
appeal to the international community to which he speaks.
Baruch is speaking in an international body, created with the
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purpose of providing collective security and facilitating
international peace and cooperation. He must appeal to the spirit of
the United Nations which is the covenant binding nations together
and to which he claims the audience is "consecrated." He is thus
true to his mandate; not only true to the reality of nuclear weapons.
In the nuclear jeremiad, the rhetor must bind a diverse world
together to create a sense of global community.
The Baruch Plan has been demonstrated to participate in the
genre of the jeremiad and, because it treats of nuclear weapons -
containing a technological sin, transgenerational effects, and a
broadened community - is shown to contain distinct
characteristics that allow the Baruch Plan to be usefully described
as a nuclear jeremiad.
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Chapter Five: Critical Assessment
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a critical assessment
of the Baruch Plan based upon insights gained by a jeremiadic
perspective. In Chapter One I proposed that by viewing the Baruch
Plan from the critical perspective of the jeremiad, significant
insight can be made into the speech and into a particular genre of
nuclear discourse. Previous chapters have demonstrated that the
speech can appropriately be viewed as a jeremiad. This chapter
discusses the critical insights and implications that flow from this
view with respect to the speech and the genre of the nuclear
jeremiad.
Judging the Baruch Plan: The Need for a Generic Perspective
As previously noted, conventional assessments of the Baruch
Plan would be negative. For example, the common neo-Aristotelian
view which focuses solely upon immediate effects would find that
the speech failed to garner sufficient support to lead to the adoption
of the policy of international control that Baruch advocates and thus
judge the speech a failure. An important recent refinement in
effects-oriented textual criticism is Ivie's metaphoric analysis of
nuclear discourse (1987). This section explicates Ivie's method and
applies it to the Baruch Plan to illustrate that even the application
of a valuable, theoretically subtle tool (such as metaphoric
analysis) absent an appropriate generic framework ignores
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important insights available to the critic.
Ivie and Metaphor
Ivie seeks to identify "sources of rhetorical invention that
have undermined" attempts to alter perspectives toward the Soviet
Union and create an atmosphere more conducive to slowing or halting
the arms race (1987, p. 166). He claims that examining the use of
metaphor in the rhetoric of Henry Wallace, J. Willliam Fulbright and
Helen Caldicot (three critics of the enemy-image of the Soviet
Union), reveals a collective failure to find a successful image to
transcend the vision of "a barbarian foe bent upon destroying the
United States" (1987, p. 168).
Ivie presents a five step process as a method to identify
metaphorical concepts. First, a critic becomes familiar with the
rhetor's written or spoken text[s] and context in order to "create a
sense of the complete experience before attending to its
particulars" (1987, p. 167). Second, the critic selects an example of
the rhetor's work and identifies "vehicles" of metaphor used by the
rhetor. A vehicle is a term "from one domain of meaning [which]
acts upon a subject. . . from another domain" (1987, p. 166). Ivie
suggests that each vehicle and its immediate context be marked and
filed in some manner so to "reduce the original text to an abriged
version that comprises only marked vehicles and their immediate
contexts" (1987, p. 167). Third, the critic arranges the vehicles into
groups by entailment. Each group, or "cluster," represents a
50
metaphorical concept. For instance, Ivie identifies one cluster in
Wallace's rhetoric which he calls the "GAME cluster comprising
terms such as 'game,' 'race,' 'cards,' 'competition,' 'play,' 'vie,' 'pawn,'
and 'team' " (p. 1 69). The fourth step is to search the text for every
occurence of the vehicles in each cluster. Finally, the list is
analyzed for "patterns of usage within and between clusters" so to
assess the effectiveness of the metaphors guiding the rhetor's
invention (1987, p.169).
Ivie suggests that Wallace, Fulbright and Caldicot failed to
effect political change because their metaphors "placed the blame
for the problem and the responsibility for its solution" solely on the
U.S. (1987, p. 172), and lacked a characterization of the Soviets that
could assure the public of the Soviet Union's ability to act
cooperatively and with good will. He concludes that the
metaphorical concepts chosen are "self defeating" because they
blame the United States alone and have not been able to transcend
the public's conviction reinforced by Cold War rhetoric that the
Soviet Union is savage.
Ivie argues that "some kind of a SYMBIOSIS metaphor must be
identified and elaborated in order to move beyond the peril" of
nuclear weapons (1 987, p. 1 81 ). He characterizes this metaphor as
one that 1) "identifies a common external enemy" of the
superpowers; 2) "encompasses the superpowers within the same
system" to further the ideal of "mutual security" while transcending
51
the ideals of communism or democracy; 3) accounts for countries
not being wholly good or evil, but being both "rational and irrational,
aggressive and pacific, competitive and cooperative, independent and
interdependent;" and 4) provides a "basis for trust" (1987, p. 180).
Such metaphor is a "mechanism of invention," he argues, that is
needed but not in evidence. An examination of the Baruch Plan
suggests that perhaps this transcendent, replacement metaphor of
symbiosis was present at the dawn of the nuclear age.
Metaphor and the Baruch Plan
Using Ivie's method to examine the Baruch Plan reveals seven
clusters of vehicles. Baruch's use of metaphor suggests that Unity
and Faith can, with Work and a Journey , lead humankind to Light and
Strength and away from Fear . First, Baruch claims that Fear besets
the world. A "portent" of "terror" causes humans to "cower" at the
"baleful," "dread power" of nuclear weapons which "menace" the
world with "heart-stopping fears." Baruch characterizes the
situation as one of extreme fear to both underscore the threat of
nuclear weapons - to make clear that the choice is "between the
quick and the dead" - and to encourage acceptance of his plan. This
fear menaces the entire world; all people are threatened by nuclear
weapons - "victor, vanquished, and neutral alike." War in the nuclear
age, Baruch claims, affects "each and every one of us." In this
manner, Baruch has drawn the world together, encompassing all
countries into the same "system" that Ivie suggests.
52
The second cluster is the metaphors of Unity . Baruch warns
that his audience must choose or "elect" "world" "cooperation" and
peace, or "world" "disintegration" and "destruction." He calls on his
"fellow citizens of the world" to work for the "common good." He
suggests that they are members of a "body," the "fathers" of which
condone and expect their action. He notes a "world movement" for
peace and calls for a "meeting of the hearts and minds" of the people
of the world. He urges his audience that in the "will of mankind"
they can find "Cosmos" and avoid "Chaos." By calling for the world to
act together against a threat to one and all, Baruch claims that
countries coexist and should act interdependently and cooperatively,
characteristic of Ivie's replacement metaphor.
This union of people is reminded by Baruch that they must have
Faith , the third cluster of metaphors. Nuclear weapons are
"devilish" and humans will be "damned" as slaves to fear if they do
not have "faith" and the "will" to attain the "miracle" of peace which
they are "consecrated" to achieve. Through unified, international
control of nuclear weapons, humans will find a "new life" and
"salvation."
The fourth cluster of images depicts a Journey which must be
undertaken in unity and with faith. This is an "escape" along a "path"
through a "tunnel." The "travelling" along this "way" is "long" but
must be "followed" to the "end of the road." Baruch characterizes his
plan as a "guerdon"--a goal. He warns his audience that it must
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travel a long way to reach its destination: peace, tranquility, and
the "fulfillment" of the aspirations of the world.
The fifth cluster of metaphors characterizes the present as
Dark and the future as Light . Nuclear weapons make things "black"
and "dim." The world is in a "tunnel" of darkness and failure to
control nuclear weapons may lead them into the "Dark Ages."
Baruch's plan or faithful journey will "light us down" in honor or
dishonor. If the audience acts, the "light gets brighter" and it will
see the "light at the end" of the tunnel. Baruch characterizes his
plan as containing a "mirror" which "reflects" the dark "emptiness,"
or the bright courage and faith of each person's heart. If they do not
act, the audience will "burrow into the earth like rats" rather than
"stand with our faces to the sun." At the least, Baruch wants his
plan to be "illuminating."
The sixth cluster of metaphors is found in Baruch's pragmatic
call for the audience to Work or construct. He wants the world to
find a "formula," "pattern," or "mechanism" with which to "erect" a
"workable plan." Their "business" is to "produce" with "skill" the
"building" of peace. In this way, humans can "put the atom to work"
and "make it work for good." The atom will be "used" for life and
will "work" for humans, rather than humans being the "slaves" of the
atom.
Finally, Baruch characterizes his plan and the humans who
undertake it by Strength rather than weakness. Humans weakly
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"cower" before nuclear weapons and peace has thus far been only a
"feverish interlude" between wars. Human strength is sapped by
nuclear weapons, which are a "famine" that "starves" humans who
"hunger" for a "secure" world. Baruch's plan challenges the world to
have the "courage" to devise an international law "with teeth in it."
Only with a "fortified" "safeguard" will humans make a "conquest" of
fear, find a "cure" for their hunger, and find their faith
"strengthened" and "deepened."
Implications of Applying Ivie's Method to the Baruch Plan
The language of the Baruch Plan provides the symbiosis that
Ivie requests. First, Baruch identifies a common enemy, rather than
blaming any particular person or nation. Nuclear weapons are
something that has been "produced." He blames the abstract concept
of "Science" for developing nuclear weapons. While he acknowledges
that nuclear weapons were first developed by the United States, it
is in a vague suggestion that they "reached fruition" there, as if they
grew unaided. He asks that the world unite to "destroy this
instrument" which further generalizes the concept and separates the
action from controlling humans. In his call for quick action he
warns that "the bomb does not wait," not that human passions or
aggression is the issue. By these choices, Baruch chooses to point
the finger at an enemy that all can blame - Science. Baruch
identifies a common enemy, and by using the metaphors of unity and
fear, he draws the world together into a single, united, cooperative
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system that needs to act as a group in order to find salvation.
Baruch's language also provides a basis for cooperation and
accounts for both sides of human nature through his metaphors of
strength and work. His plan is a plan with "teeth" and a "workable"
plan that encourages the audience to not merely have faith in the
"pious" hopes of peace, but the "enforceable sanctions" of the
community. His proposal emphasizes the need for punishment for
those who would retreat from their commitment to renounce nuclear
weapons. This allows him to account for the aggressive, irrational,
competitive side of nations by acknowledging that "mere words" will
not ensure peace, but that the force of law will. His rejection of
the veto also serves this end. He accounts for the possibility that a
competitive, aggressive, irrational country acting independently
will try to veto the imposition of punishment on a violator of the
international agreement. The practical tone of the speech which
presents the specifics of the proposal makes it clear that Baruch is
not offering platitudes and has a view of the world that takes
account of antagonistic motives. Given the veto and sanction
components of the proposal, Baruch is able to more credibly ask for
the world's trust. He acknowledges and accounts for violation of the
agreement, and thus nations can feel that there is substance to the
proposal which justifies their trust and faith.
Ivie's claim is that the absence of the replacement metaphor
accounts for the failure to curb the arms race. However, Baruch's
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plan offers the vision through metaphor that Ivie seeks: it
identifies a common enemy, unifies the parties involved, takes
account of both negative and positive motives, and provides a basis
for trust. It may be argued then, that by Ivie's standards, the Baruch
Plan should have "worked" or succeeded but did not. If it meets Ivie's
standards and did not "work," then Ivie's claims need to be
reassessed. Perhaps use of metaphor is not as decisive a factor in
altering the arms race as Ivie would hold. Certainly, extra-textual
elements need to be considered. For instance, conviction does not
necessary lead to action and the Baruch Plan, while convincing a
huge segment of the population to approve of international control,
could not in itself provide empowerment necessary to achieve
political action.
However, the claim that speeches or texts which contain the
metaphor of symbiosis have not succeeded is misguided. A
reconceptuatlization of what is meant by success and failure is in
order given the jeremiadic framework within which the Baruch Plan
belongs. If a critic identifies genre as purely deliberative, then
immediate success and failure of policy proposals is an appropriate
standard of judgment. However, if the Baruch Plan (or other
discourse of the nuclear jeremiad) is epideictic as well, then
judgments of success and failure of the speech and its metaphors
are less clear-cut. Seeing the Baruch Plan as a jeremiad allows the
critic to evaluate the speech over time, given the epideictic
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functions of a jeremiad and the broader time-frame for success and
failure.
Judging the Baruch Plan: The Value of the Jeremiadic
Perspective
The Baruch Plan can usefully be characterized as a nuclear
jeremiad which possesses both epideictic and deliberative elements.
As such, it can be judged as a successful speech. Baruch offers a
vision of the world that speaks to us today. His audience is all
generations that are held in the grip of nuclear weapons. The
opportunity to embrace internationalism, faith, and cooperation, and
to renounce nuclear weapons, is an opportunity that has remained.
Although the risks of nuclear war have increased over time, the
chance for choosing Baruch's plan is still available. If anything, his
message rings more truly, and his warning sounds more clearly, each
day that passes.
Baruch's speech provides a context which should be broadly
construed and not merely seen in time. The context of the Baruch
Plan is an audience of the entire world and a time measured by each
day of the passing arms race. Its audience is every person who lives
in a world with nuclear weapons and particularly "all of those who
are interested in a meaningful interpretation of the history and
moral status" of the world community (Black, 1978, p. 84).
The speech provides a moral interpretation of human folly and
human potential which offers timeless insights. Each phase of the
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arms race, every proposal accepted and rejected, every new call for
peace, allows Baruch's insights and warnings to be more clearly
perceived. Black describes the Coatsville Address in a manner which
applies just as well to the Baruch Plan: "The passage of time,
therefore, can only enable the audiences to this speech to apprehend
its ramifications, to discern the range of its applicability, to
explicate its complexities and absorb its overtones" (Black, 1978, p.
88). In 1946, Baruch's speech began a dialogue and process of arms
control negotiations that have not ended. As long as there are
nuclear weapons, the dialogue continues.
Not only does Baruch's speech still live and address itself to a
comtemporary audience, but the receptiveness of that audience to
Baruch's words may grow over time. Given that the jeremiad entails
prophecy warning of doom in the future, a jeremiad may only find its
audience in the years that follow the warning. One can hope that
Baruch's speech may continue to find "its understanding audience,
and it may be that that audience will grow larger and more attentive
with every passing day" (Black, 1978, p. 88).
Baruch's speech also educates the audience by shaping "the
appropriate reaction" to the crisis of nuclear weapons (Black, 1978,
p. 85). By placing the burden on all "citizens of the world," and
demanding unity and action, Baruch makes indifference a difficult
reaction in his readers. His arguments make clear that those who
"remain detached" from the situation deny their responsibility for
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action and embrace the cowardice and emptiness that Baruch damns.
Baruch thus "forces the auditor to. . . examine his own relationship"
to the problem, thereby reducing the possibility of "passive
indifference" (Black, 1978, p. 85). The vivid, emotional, fearful
language that Baruch adopts makes a clinical response difficult. If
he had only presented the specifics of his proposal, than it would be
easier for the audience to respond in a sanitized, detached manner.
His language makes action more likely, since an absence of "moral
zeal" as a dimension would allow his audience distance and would
fail to engage them personally, thus "paralyzing" action on the part
of his audience (Black, 1978, p. 86-87).
Judging Nuclear Jeremiads: Implications for the Future
Examination of the Baruch Plan from the jeremiadic
perspective and the illustration of the Baruch Plan as nuclear
jeremiad affords implications for future critical studies of nuclear
discourse. When viewing nuclear discourse, critics should be
attuned to the appearance of epideictic elements in what might be
seen at first blush as purely deliberative examples of nuclear
discourse. A jeremiadic framework affords a potentially valuable
perspective on nuclear discourse because it accomodates both the
deliberative and epideictic demands of the genre.
First, the assessment of nuclear discourse which can be
considered jeremiadic suggests that the critic should view texts as
offering a moral view of a scientific/technological problem. The
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rhetor in the jeremiad is seeking to affirm values in the audience
and to adjust nuclear policy with those values. The critic evaluates
not only the policy but the values offered by the rhetor in the
jeremiad.
Second, nuclear jeremiads require the critic to be sensitive to
changes that occur over time. The rhetor addresses future
generations, given the transgenerational effects of nuclear weapons.
The examination of the Baruch Plan from a jeremiadic perspective
allows the speech to be praised as a success across time, yet
damned as a failure in achieving the implementation of the policy in
1946. Judgment of nuclear jeremiads needs to be sensitive to the
alteration of policy that may occur slowly. Also, since jeremiads
are epideictic in function, as well as deliberative, the critic should
be aware of adherence to values promoted over time. Policy change
requires that the audience be convinced of the values implied by that
action. The promotion of adherence to values is a worthy end of
discourse itself: "the sharing of values is an end pursued
independently of the precise circumstances in which this communion
will be put to the test" (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 53).
Third, criticism of nuclear jeremiads should reflect an
awareness of the difficulty of action given the scientific nature of
the problem. Given the difficulty for the audience in taking direct
action, and because they may not perceive or really have the power
to act, the critic should afford attention to indirect action. If the
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rhetor empowers the audience in some manner by casting the
problem in moral terms or by suggesting an action that can create
the ability for long-term moral choices, than judgment of nuclear
jeremiads need to account for this indirect form of action.
Conclusion
This thesis has argued that examining the Baruch Plan from the
generic perspective of the jeremiad provides unique and valuable
insight into the speech itself. It has also suggested that the
presence of deliberative and epideictic elements in jeremiads,
coupled with the distinctive characteristics of the nuclear
jeremiad, permits a positive assessment of the Baruch Plan and
opens up the opportunity for critics to examine other nuclear
discourse for signs of the jeremiad.
The Baruch Plan is a speech which "preserves a morally
significant event" (Black, 1978, p. 89). It makes the early moments
of the nuclear age "permanent in history - timeless" by pointing to
transcendent values and timely threats; making "available to the
future the experience" of confronting and responding to an "objective
occurence that has struck the mind as morally critical" (Black,
1978, p. 89). Chapter One suggested that understanding the nuclear
past is critical if we are to understand the nuclear present and
future. The Baruch Plan's contribution to this process of peace is
priceless, since it addresses itself to audiences of yesterday, today,
and tomorrow. The speech expresses timeless truths about human
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nature and the nature of nuclear weapons and war. Baruch makes
clear the bleak future facing humanity if nuclear weapons are not
controlled. To a great extent his prophecy has come true. "If, to
some, Baruch has seemed a Jeremiah crying needless havoc, who is
there today who would deny that his sharpest warnings have been
justified by events?" (Rosenbloom, 1953, p. 312). The world today
remains a slave of fear. The Baruch Plan is an effective speech
since it expresses a vision that can motivate audiences today to
consider the nature of war, the implications of nuclear weapons, to
question the policies of their governments, and to push for action.
To the extent that Baruch's speech-text helped and continues to help
the dialogue begun in 1946 to continue today, and spurs people to
become more aware of and more convinced of the evil of nuclear
weapons, the Baruch Plan should be judged a success.
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Appendix
The Baruch P lan: Statement bv United States Representative Baruch
to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. June 14. 1946
My fellow members of the United Nations Atomic Energy
Commission, and my fellow citizens of the world: We are here to
make a choice between the quick and the dead. That is our business.
Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which,
seized upon with faith, can work our salvation. If we fail, then we
have dmaned every man to be the slave of Fear. Let us not deceive
ourselves: We must elect World Peace or World Destruction.
Science has torn from nature a secret so vast in its
potentialities that our minds cower from the terror it creates. Yet
terror is not enough to inihibit the use of the atomic bomb. The
terror created by weapons has never stopped man from employing
them. For each new weapon a defense has been produced, in time.
But now we face a condition in which adequate defense does not
exist.
Science, which gave us this dread power, shows that it can be
made a giant help to humanity, but science does noj_show us how to
prevent its baleful use. So we have been appointed to obviate that
peril by finding a meeting of the minds and the hearts of our people.
Only in the will of mankind lies the answer.
It is to express this will and make it effective that we have
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been assembled. We must provide the mechanism to assure that
atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes and preclude its use in
war. To that end, we must provide immediate, swift, and sure
punishment of those who violate the agreements that are reached by
the nations. Penalization is essential if peace is to be more than a
feverish interlude between wars. And, too, the United Nations can
prescribe individual responsibility and punishment on the principles
applied at Nurnberg by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United Kingdom, France, and the United States -- a formula certain
to benefit the world's future.
In this crisis, we represent not only our governments but, in a
larger way, we represent the peoples of the world. We must
remember that the peoples do not belong to the governments but that
the governments belong to the peoples. We must answer their
demands; we must answer the world's longing for peace and security.
In that desire the United States shares ardently and hopefully.
The search of science for the absolute weapon has reached fruition
in this country. But she stands ready to proscribe and destroy this
instrument -- to lift its use from death to life - if the world will
join in a pact to that end.
In our success lies the promise of a new life, freed from the
heart-stopping fears that now beset the world. The beginning of
victory for the great ideals for which millions have bled and died
lies in building a workable plan. Now we approach fulfilment of the
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aspirations of mankind. At the end of the road lies the fairer,
better, surer life we crave and mean to have.
Only by a lasting peace are liberties and democracies
strengthened and deepened. War is their enemy. And it will not do
to believe that any of us can escape war's devastation. Victor,
vanquished, and neutrals alike are affected physically, economically,
and morally.
Against the degradation of war we can erect a safeguard. That
is the guerdon for which we reach. Within the scope of the formula
we outline here there will be found, to those who seek it, the
essential elements of our purpose. Others will see only emptiness.
Each of us carries his own mirror in which is reflected hope - or
determined desperation - courage or cowardice.
There is a famine throughout the world today. It starves men's
bodies. But there is a greater famine -- the hunger of men's spirit.
That starvation can be cured by the conquest of fear, and the
substitution of hope, from which springs faith -- faith in each other,
faith that we want to work together toward salvation, and
determination that those who threaten the peace and safety shall be
punished.
The peoples of these democracies gathered here have a
particular concern with our answer, for their peoples hate war.
They will have a heavy exaction to make of those who fail to provide
an escape. They are not afraid of an internationalism that protects;
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they are unwilling to be fobbed off by mouthings about narrow
sovereignty, which is today's phrase for yesterday's isolation.
The basis of a sound foreign policy, in this new age, for all the
nations here gathered, is that anything that happens, no matter
where or how, which menaces the peace of the world, or the
economic stability, concerns each and all of us.
That, roughly, may be said to be the central theme of the
United Nations. It is with that thought we begin consideration of the
most important subject that can engage mankind - life itself.
Let there be no quibbling about the duty and the responsibility
of this group and of the governments we represent. I was moved, in
the afternoon of my life, to add my effort to gain the world's quest,
by the broad mandate under which we were created. The resolution
of the General Assembly, passed January 24, 1946 in London, reads:
"Section V. Terms of Reference of the Commission
"The Commission shall proceed with the utmost dispatch and
enquire into all phases of the problems, and make such
recommendations from time to time with respect to them as it finds
possible. In particular the Commission shall make specific
proposals:
(a) For extending between all nations the exchange of basic
scientific information for peaceful ends;
(b) For control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to
ensure its use only for peaceful purposes;
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(c) For the elimination from national armaments of atomic
weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass
destruction;
(d) For effective safeguards by way of inspection and other
means to protect complying States against the hazards of
violations and evasions.
The work of the Commission should proceed by separate
stages, the successful completion of each of which will develop the
necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is
undertaken. ..."
Our mandate rests, in text and in spirit, upon the outcome of
the Conference in Moscow of Messrs. Molotov of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, Bevin of the United Kingdom, and Byrrnes of the
United States of America. The three Foreign Ministers on December
27, 1945 proposed the establishment of this body.
Their action was animated by a preceding conference in
Washington on November 15, 1945, when the President of the United
States, associated with Mr. Attlee, Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom, and Mr. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada, stated
that international control of the whole field of atomic energy was
immediately essential. They proposed the formation of this body. In
examining that source, the Agreed Declaration, it will be found that
the fathers of the concept recognized the final means of world
salvation -- the abolition of war. Solemnly they wrote:
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"We are aware that the only complete protection for the
civilized world from the destructive use of scientific knowledge
lies in the prevention of war. No system of safeguards that can be
devised will of itself provide an effective guarantee against
production of atomic weapons by a nation bent on aggression. Nor
can we ignore the possibility of the devlopment of other weapons, or
of new methods of warfare, which may constitute as great a threat
to civilization as the military use of atomic energy."
Through the historical approach I have outlined, we find
ourselves here to test if man can produce, through his will and faith,
the miracle of peace, just as he has, through science and skill, the
miracle of the atom.
The United States proposes the creation of an international
Atomic Development Authority, to which should be entrusted all
phases of the development and use of atomic energy, starting with
the raw material and including -
1) Managerial control or ownership of all atomic energy
activities potentially dangerous to world securtiy.
2) Power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic
activities.
3) The duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy.
4) Research and development responsibilities of an
affirmative character intended to put the Authority in the forefront
of atomic knowledge and thus to enable it to comprehend, and
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therefore to detect, misuse of atomic energy. To be effective, the
Authority must itself be the world's leader in the field of atomic
knowledge and development and thus supplement its legal authority
with the great power inherent in possession of leadership in
knowledge.
I offer this as a basis for beginning our discussion.
But I think the peoples we serve would not believe -- and
without faith nothing counts -- that a treaty, merely outlawing
possession or use of the atomic bomb, constitutes effective
fulfilment of the instructions to this Commission. Previous failures
have been recorded in trying the method of simple renunciation,
unsupported by effective guaranties of security and armament
limitation. No one would have faith in that approach alone.
Now, if ever, is the time to act for the comon good. Public
opinion supports a world movement toward security. If I read the
signs aright, the peoples want a program not composed merely of
pious thoughts but of enforceable sanctions -- an international law
with teeth in it.
We of this nation, desirous of helping to bring peace to the
world and realizing the heavy obligations upon us arising from our
possesion of the means of producing the bomb and from the fact that
it is part of our armament, are prepared to make our full
contribution toward effective control of atomic energy.
When an adequate system for control of atomic energy,
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including the renunciation of the bomb as a weapon, has been agreed
upon and put into effective operation and condign punishments set up
for violations of the rules of control which are to be stigmatized as
international crimes, we propose that --
1) Manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop;
2) Existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the terms of
the treaty; and
3) The Authority shall be in posssession of full information as
to the know-how for the production of atomic energy.
Let me repeat, so as to avoid misunderstanding: My country is
ready to make its full contribution toward the end we seek, subject
of course to our constitutional processes and to an adequate system
of control becoming fully effective, as we finally work it out.
Now as to violations: In the agreement, penalities of as
serious nature as the nations may wish and as immediate and certain
in their execution as possible should be fixed for -
1) Illegal possession or use of an atomic bomb;
2) Illegal possession, or separation, of atomic material
suitable for use in an atomic bomb;
3) Seizure of any plant or other property belonging to or
licensed by the Authority;
4) Willful interference with the activities of the Authority;
5) Creation or operation of dangerous projects in a manner
contrary to, or in the absense of, a license granted by the
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international body.
It would be a deception, to which I am unwilling to lend
myself, were I not to say to you and to our peoples that the matter
of punishment lies at the very heart of our present security system.
It might as well be admitted, here and now, that the subject goes
straight to the veto power contained in the Charter of the United
Nations so far as it relates to the field of atomic energy. The
Charter permits penalization only by concurrence of each of the five
great powers - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
Kingdom, China, France, and the United States.
I want to make very plain that I am concerned here with the
veto power only as it affects this particular problem. There must be
no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to
develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes.
The bomb does not wait upon debate. To delay may be to die.
The time between violation and preventive action or punishment
would be all too short for extended discussion as to the course to be
followed.
As matters now stand several years may be necessary for
another country to produce a bomb, do novo. However, once the basic
information is generally known, and the Authority has established
producing plants for peaceful purposes in the several countries, an
illegal seizure of such a plant might permit a malevolent nation to
produce a bomb in 12 months, and if preceded by secret preparation
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and necessary facilities perhaps even in a much shorter time. The
time required - the advance warning given of the possible use of a
bomb -- can only be generally estimated but obviously will depend
upon many factors, including the success with which the Authority
has been able to introduce elements of safety in the design of its
plants and the degree to which illegal and secret preparation for the
military use of atomic energy will have been eliminated.
Presumably no nation would think of starting a war with only one
bomb.
This shows how imperative speed is in detecting and
penalizing violations.
The process of prevention and penalization - a problem of
profound statecraft - is, as I read it, implicit in the Moscow
statement, signed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United States, and the United Kingdom a few months ago.
But before a country is ready to relinquish any winning
weapons it must have more than words to reassure it. It must have
a guarantee of safety, not only against the offenders in the atomic
area but against the illegal users of other weapons --
bacteriological, biological, gas - perhaps- why not? - against war
itself.
In the elimination of war lies our solution, for only then will
nations cease to compete with one another in the producton and use
of dread "secret" weapons which are evaluated solely by their
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capacity to kill. This devilish program takes us back not merely to
the Dark Ages but from cosmos to chaos. If we succeed in finding a
suitable way to control atomic weapons, it is reasonable to hope
that we may also preclude the use of other weapons adaptable to
mass destruction. When a man learns to say "A" he can, if he
chooses, learn the rest of the alphabet too.
Let this be anchored in our minds:
Peace is never long preserved by weight of metal or by an
armament race. Peace can be made tranquil and secure only by
understanding and agreement fortified by sanctions. We must
embrace international cooperation or international disintegration.
Science has taught us how to put the atom to work. But to
make it work for good instead of for evil lies in the domain dealing
with the principles of human duty. We are now facing a problem
more of ethics than of physics.
The solution will require apparent sacrifice in pride and in
position, but better pain as the price of peace than death as the
price of war.
I now submit the folowing measures as representing the
fundamental features of a plan which would give effect to certain of
the conclusions which I have epitomized.
1 . General . The Authority should set up a thorough plan for
control of the field of atomic energy, through various forms of
ownership, dominion, licenses, operation, inspection, research , and
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management by competent personnel. After this is provided for,
there should be as little interference as may be with the economic
plans and the present private, corporate, and state relationships in
the serveral countries involved.
2. Raw Materials . The Authority should have as one of its
earliest purposes to obtain and maintain complete and accurate
information on world supplies of uranium and thorium and to bring
them under its dominion. The precise pattern of control for various
types of deposits of such materials will have to depend upon the
geological, mining, refining, and economic facts involved in
different nations.
The Authority should conduct continuous surveys so that it
will have the most complete knowledge of the world geology of
uranium and thorium. Only after all current information on world
sources of uranium and thorium is know to us all can equitable plans
be made for their production, refining, and distribution.
3. Primary Production Plants . The Authority should exercise
complete managerial control of the production of fissionable
materials. This means that it should control and operate all plants
producing fissionable materials in dangerous quantities and must
own and control the product of these plants.
4. Atomic Explosives . The Authority should be given sole and
exclusive right to conduct research in the field of atomic explosives.
Research activities in the field of atomic explosives are esential in
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order that the Authority may keep in the forefront of knowledge in
the field of atomic energy and fulfill the objective of preventing
illicit manufacture of bombs. Only by maintaining its position as
the best-informed agency will the Authority be able to determine
the line between intrinsically dangerous and non-dangerous
activities.
5. Strategic Distribution of Activities and Materials. The
activities entrusted exclusively to the Authority because they are
intrinsically dangerous to security should be distributed throughout
the world. Similarly, stockpiles of raw materials and fissionable
materials should not be centralized.
6. Non-Dangerous Activities. A function of the Authority
should be promotion of the peacetime benefits of atomic energy.
Atomic research (except in explosives), the use of research
reactors; the production of radioactive traces by means of
non-dangeorus reactors, the use of such tracers, and to some extent
the production of power should be open to nations and their citizens
under reasonable licensing arrangements from the Authority.
Denatured materials, whose use we know also requires suitable
safeguards, should be furnished for such purposes by the Authority
under lease or other arrangement. Denaturing seems to have been
overestimated by the public as a safety measure.
7. Definition of Dangerous and Non-Dangerous Activities .
Although a reasonable dividing line can be drawn between dangerous
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and non-dangerous activities, it is not hard and fast. Provision
should, therefore, be made to assure constant reexamination of the
questions and to permit revision of the dividing line as changing
conditions and new discoveries may require.
8. Operations of Dangerous Activities . Any plant dealing with
uranium or thorium after it once reaches the potential of dangerous
use must be not only subject to the most rigorous and competent
inspection by the Authority, but its actual operation shall be under
the management, supervision, and control of the Authority.
9. Inspection . By assigning intrinsically dangerous activities
exclusively to the Authority, the difficulties of inspection are
reduced. If the Authority is the only agency which may lawfully
conduct dangerous activities, then visible operation by others than
the Authority will constitute an unambiguous danger signal.
Inspection will also occur in connection with the licensing functions
of the Authority.
10. Freedom of Access . Adequate ingress and egress for all
qualified representatives of the Authority must be assured. Many of
the inspection activities of the Authority should grow out of, and be
incidental to, its other functions. Important measures of inspection
will be associated with the tight control of raw materials, for this
is a keystone of the plan. The continuing activities of prospecting,
survey, and research in relation to raw materials will be designed
not only to serve the affirmative development functions of the
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Authority but also to assure that no surreptitious operations are
conducted in the raw-materials field by nations or their citizens.
1 1
.
Personnel . The personnel of the Authority should be
recruited on a basis of proven competence but also so far as possible
on an international basis.
1 2. Progress bv Stages . A primary step in the creation of the
system of control is the setting forth, in comprehensive terms, of
the functions, responsibilities, powers, and limitations of the
Authority. Once a charter for the Authority has been adopted, the
Authority and the system of control for which it will be responsibile
will require time to become fully organized and effective. The plan
of control will, therefore, have to come into effect in successive
stages. These should be specifically fixed in the charter or means
should be otherwise set forth in the charter for transitions from one
stage to another, as contemplated in the resolution of the United
Nations Assembly which created this Commission.
13. Disclosures . In the deliberations of the United Nations
Commission on Atomic Energy, the United States is prepared to make
available the information essential to a reasonable understanding of
the proposals which it advocates. Further disclosures must be
dependent in the interests of all, upon the effective ratification of
the treaty. When the Authority is actually created, the United
States will join the other nations in making available the further
information essentiil to that organization for the performance of its
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functions. As the successive stages of international control are
reached, the United States will be prepared to yield, to the extent
required by each stage, national control of activities in this field to
the Authority.
14. International Control . There will be questions about the
extent of control to be allowed to national bodies, when the
Authority is established. Purely national authorities for control and
development of atomic energy should to the extent necessary for the
effective operation of the Authority be subordinate to it. This is
neither an endorsement nor a disapproval of the creation of national
authorities. The Commission should evolve a clear demarcation of
the scope of duties and responsibilites of such national authorities.
And now I end. I have submitted an outline for present
discussion. Our consideration will be broadened by the criticism of
the United States proposals and by the plans of the other nations,
which, it is to be hoped, will be submitted at their early
convenience. I and my associates of the United States Delegation
will make available to each member of this body books and
pamphlets, including the Acheson-Lilienthal report, recently made
by the United States Department of State, and the McMahon
Committee Monograph No.1 entitled "Essential Information on Atomic
Energy" relating to the McMahon bill recently passed by the United
States Senate, which may prove of value in assessing the situation.
All of us are consecrated to making an end of gloom and
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hopelessness. It will not be an easy job. The way is long and thorny,
but supremely worth traveling. All of us want to stand erect, with
our faces to the sun, instead of being forced to burrow inot the
ground, like rats.
The pattern of salvation must be worked out by all for all.
The light at the end of the tunnel is dim, but our path seems to
grow brighter as we actually begin our journey. We cannot yet light
the way to the end. However, we hope the suggestions of my
Government will be illuminating.
Let us keep in mind the exhortation of Abraham Lincoln, whose
words, uttered at a moment of shattering national peril, form a
complete text for our deliberation. I quote, paraphrasing slightly:
"We cannot escape history. We of this meeting will be
rememered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance or
insignificance can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through
which we are passing will light us down in honor or dishonor to the
latest generation.
We say we are for Peace. The world will not forget that we
say this. We know how to save Peace. The world knows that we do.
We, even we here, hold the power and have the responsibility.
We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last, best hope of
earth. The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just - a way which, if
followed, the world will forever applaud."
My thanks for your attention.
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This thesis examines a speech delivered to the United
Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1946 by Bernard Baruch.
It argues that significant insight can be made into the speech
by examining the Baruch Plan from the rhetorical perspective of
the jeremiad genre. It argues that a generic framework
approaches jeremiadic discourse as containing both
deliberative and epideictic elements. As such, judgments of
success and failure need to take generic characteristics of
nuclear discourse into account. It further argues that the
Baruch Plan can usefully be characterized as a "nuclear
jeremiad," a form of the traditional jeremiad that is attuned to
the nature of a nuclear world.
